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Laws can be written along a spectrum of specificity, ranging from vague standards to more 
detailed rules with particular examples. Behavioral and legal scholarship each present conflicting 
views about the optimal degree of specificity with which laws should be designed. From a 
behavioral standpoint, specificity is important to help people understand their goals and use their 
cognitive resources in a focused manner. At the same time, ambiguity in the law can even 
encourage good people to engage in creative interpretations of legal requirements, allowing them 
to justify unethical behavior, with limited awareness of the meaning of that behavior. By contrast, 
theories of crowding out, trust, and cooperation suggest that specificity can create resentment and 
lead to under-compliance and under-performance. These conflicting views about the effects of 
specificity serve as the background for this experimental project. This paper studies the effects of 
specificity on behavior in response to a directive that shares important features with the law. First, 
we examine the effect of specificity on compliance (following a directive) versus performance 
(beyond a minimum threshold). Second, we compare the controlling, limiting effects of 
specificity with its instructive, informative effects by comparing the interaction between 
specificity and monitoring with the interaction between specificity and good faith. We 
hypothesized that the combination of specificity and monitoring enhances the effect of specificity 
on compliance but harms performance and trust, whereas the combination of specificity and good 
faith enhances both the informative goal-setting aspects of specificity and people’s sense of 
commitment. The study employs an experimental design in which subjects edit a document after 
being exposed to detailed (vague) instructions, with (without) a reference to good faith, and with 
(without) monitoring (through sanctioning). The assignments were designed in such a way that 
people could engage in various levels of editing (both required and not required, reasonable and 
more than reasonable), allowing us to measure distinctly both compliance and performance. Our 
results suggest that when participants require information and guidance, as in the case of editing a 
document, specificity increases performance even beyond what is required relative to a vague 
standard condition. 
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1. Introduction  
The optimal specificity of directives is one of the most basic questions in law. Most 
theoretical lines of research have addressed the level of discretion that should be given to 
adjudicators as well as to lay people who need to comply with the law. This paper will focus on 
the impact of specificity on the meaning of the law and on individual-level decision-making. We 
will examine whether the trade-off between specificity and uncertainty postulated by classical 
law and economics perspectives undergoes significant changes if we combine the behavioral and 
rational choice accounts of specificity.  
  The rational choice and behavioral literatures contain a web of conflicting theories about 
how specific a law ought to be for it to have an optimal effect. Specificity can create a trade-off 
between treating individuals strictly, which ensures that minimum thresholds are met, and 
allowing them greater discretion, which can generate goodwill, possibly resulting in higher 
overall performance. In a related vein, the literature has considered what level of monitoring 
optimizes compliance, and when intrinsic motivation is better than monitoring at promoting 
compliance (Garoupa, 1997, 2003). Building these subtleties into the language of the law adds 
yet another level of complexity to the issue.  
The theoretical literature on rational choice (e.g., multi-task agency, measurement 
paradoxes) and behavioral issues (e.g., crowding out, justice motivation, goal setting, and 
resentment) has made numerous competing predictions about how these various forces interact 
(which we review below). Further complicating our ability to create straightforward predictions 
are the distinct and disparate effects of ambiguity predicted by the rational choice and behavioral 
literatures. For example, whereas the rational choice literature claims that ambiguity can lead to a 
chilling effect, the behavioral literature predicts that ambiguity can lead to under-compliance 
owing to self-deception (about one’s own compliance). 
Recognizing that the theoretical bases for the effects of specificity are complex, we seek 
to understand which is more important for the law: the effect of specificity on compliance or its 
effect on performance? The management literature has suggested various answers to this 
question in the context of organizations. We wish to extend this question to the law, where in 
certain contexts specificity can be helpful in encouraging individuals to follow the letter of the 
law (compliance), but it may be harmful when we want individuals to follow the spirit of the law 
(performance).  
The paper offers a richer behavioral account for specificity in law, which will be sensitive 
to the different functions of specificity and to the motivational mode of the individual.   It is our 
belief that some of the conflicting views in the literature are related to an over inclusive 
treatment of sensitivity and to a limited account of the interaction between the cognitive and 
motivational accounts of specificity. Hence, to achieve a more realistic understanding of the 
contexts in which specificity may affect behavior, we attempt to understand its effect on the two 
main normative approaches, monitoring and deterrence on the one hand, and good faith and 
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morality on the other. Based on the current literature, the combination of these two motivational 
aspects captures much of the relevant variation in the direction of the effect of legal specificity 
on compliance and performance.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Part 2 of the paper, we show that the question of 
optimal level of details in law is of importance for several legal doctrines. We review some of 
the main paradigms in this field and highlight some open areas that can be investigated 
empirically.  
Next, we suggest that some of the reasons this question is still open in law is related to 
the even greater inconsistency that exists both in the rational choice and the behavioral literature. 
We review and compare some of the leading theories about how people are expected to respond 
to specific versus vague instructions. The core of our argument has to do with the interaction 
between specificity and motivations for compliance. We also review the literature on intrinsic-
extrinsic motivation, enforcement approaches, and the effect of measurement on behavior. Based 
on this review, we suggest some competing predictions about the possible effects of these three 
foactors, individually and together. 
 We proceed in Part 3 to present the empirical research questions and the unique 
methodological design that we use to gauge the effects of specificity on behavior. We explain 
why the context of language enables us to compare the effect of editing instructions on a narrow 
notion of compliance (doing what’s required) with a broad notion of compliance (fixing errors 
which were not present in the specific instructions) as well as of a third category of errors which 
required extra effort or beyond reasonable compliance, which we call performance (e.g. content 
related fixes)
1
. 
To create an empirical paradigm, which will allow for a comparison between the two 
types of behaviors we are after – compliance and performance – we have focused on a specific 
genre of legal specificity, which we refer to as example giving. While people might usually refer 
to driving 55 miles per hour as the classical prototype of specificity, we believe the dilemma of 
whether regulators should provide laws with detailed examples as to the meaning of the law is 
highly important for many legal doctrines. Part of this type of specificity has recently received an 
analytical treatment by Parchomovsky and Stein (2014) who define example giving as a “catalog” 
approach.  According to their approach, which focuses mainly on the interaction between the 
legislative branch and the judicial branch, in many areas of law there is a middle hybrid approach 
that employs vague standards on one hand and detailed examples on the other hand, which is 
                                                 
1
 Please note that we are examining also the effect of specificity on compliance and performance in a 
different context, where people need to evaluate their own behavior, as representing the situation of a sale 
of a product. The results for this experiment will be reported in a different study that focuses on the 
interaction between legal specificity and ethical decision making.  
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aimed at helping people understand the rationale of the specific law.
2
 Indeed, in reality, the 
situation is even broader: specific laws or contracts do not provide any general standard 
regarding the overall purpose of the law or contract in addition to the specific instructions. Hence, 
we believe that accounting for this type of legal specificity carries importance for numerous 
private law doctrines as well as many types of commercial contracts.
3
  
Following a presentation of the findings of the study on the effect of example giving on 
compliance and behavior under conditions of either good-faith or monitoring, in Part 4 we 
examine the implications of the findings for the legal context in which some level of specificity 
needs to be chosen and we elaborate on the limitations of the study. 
2. Existing Approaches to Specificity 
2.1 Accounts of Specificity in Law and Economics 
In legal scholarship, much of the debate on the optimal specificity of law comes from the 
“rules versus standards” paradigm, where standards are vaguer than rules. Kaplow’s (1992) 
seminal paper on this topic and many follow-up studies have translated the notion of “optimal 
specificity” into “optimization of information costs.” Kaplow includes various costs and benefits 
of rules versus standards in his model, but broadly speaking, rules are more costly to create but 
cheaper to enforce.  
 Some economic analyses point to the benefits of vagueness, but these benefits are often 
the flip side of costs. Thus, vagueness can smooth out the liability function, which may reduce 
the cost of errors in selecting the point at which the sanction sets in (Cooter 1984; Craswell and 
Calfee 1986). Contracting parties often include vague terms in their contracts, which can serve as 
a commitment device that increases the cost of litigation (Choi and Triantis 2010). An additional 
perspective comes from the multi-tasking paradigm that focuses on the problems that occur when 
some aspects of someone’s own work are easier to monitor than others. According to the rational 
choice prediction, the agent focuses most of her work on the tasks for which she can be given an 
incentive (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  
  An additional line of research in law and economics focuses on the chilling effect, a 
form of over-compliance. Ferguson and Peters (2000) argue that "the optimal amount of 
vagueness in a rule strikes a balance between the costs of loopholes, the chilling effect on 
economic activity, and the inefficiency created in the legal system." Economic analyses focus on 
how risk-neutral agents might over-comply with a vague law if the law is built around the 
                                                 
2
 The following example of a catalog is offered on p. 21 of their paper regarding the meaning of prohibited 
dangerous weapons: “any pistol or other firearm (or imitation thereof) or other dangerous or deadly weapon 
(including a sawed-off shotgun, shotgun, machinegun, rifle, dirk, bowie knife, butcher knife, switchblade 
knife, razor, blackjack, billy, or metallic or other false knuckles).” D.C. St. § 22-4502 (2013). 
3
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optimal standard, albeit vaguely. For example, Kyle Logue (2007) and others have noted that 
risk-averse taxpayers would over-comply with an uncertain legal rule coupled with high 
penalties. Calfee and Craswell (1986) showed that risk-neutral agents would be subject to two 
behavioral effects of legal uncertainty: uncertainty would reduce deterrence because of the 
prospect of escaping liability wrongfully (a false negative), but in a variety of contexts, this 
effect would be dominated by a tendency toward over-compliance, which has been recognized, 
for example, in tax law.  Under a vague standard, uncertainty can cause damages to rise more 
quickly than social harm around the optimal point, leading the actor to reduce the expected 
liability by inefficiently over-complying. 
2.2 The Behavioral Perspective  
From a behavioral perspective, compliance with rules that do and do not include detailed 
examples, is not solely a matter of decision under risk, but rather, it encompass a whole array of 
cognitive (e.g., attention, information) and motivational (e.g. resentment, trust and commitment) 
factors.  Hence, the behavioral account of specificity supplements the rational choice perspective 
in a few ways: it provides a richer and more nuanced view of the different functions served by 
specificity and, in addition, it enables a better understanding of the interaction between 
specificity and the motivation people have toward the behavior. Our study demonstrates that, by 
taking this nuanced approach to specificity, we can improve the predictability of the effect of 
specificity on behavior in different contexts.  
On the motivational side, behavioral research focuses on aspects such as work morale and 
resentment that may lead subjects to view specificity and over-detailed rules as a sign of mistrust 
and as a signal to extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivation (i.e. crowding out). On the positive 
side, the literature on motivated reasoning and self-concept maintenance, specificity might 
reduce the option for self-serving biases. The cognitive literature also points in multiple 
directions. In a negative cognitive effect, specificity causes subjects to pay too much attention to 
detailed instructions and to succumb to an availability bias, leading to unintended ignorance of 
other unspecified aspects. In contrast, on the positive cognitive side of specificity, literature such 
as that on goal-setting suggests that specificity may increase work focus better than “do your 
best.”   
An additional way in which the behavioral literature contributes to the rational choice 
discussion is by emphasizing the distinction between compliance and performance. Elsewhere 
we have demonstrated the importance of this dichotomy for legal theory (see Feldman and Smith, 
2014).  While in compliance we focus on people doing exactly as required, in performance we 
measure whether people making an extra effort to fulfil the spirit of the request (see Garcia  et al 
2014). There are also various intermediate level of behaviors, which the literature sometimes 
terms “beyond compliance” or extra role behavior (see e.g. Kim and Mauborgne 1996). 
 In the following paragraphs, we develop these conflicting views in the literature in a 
clearer and more analytical way.  
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2.2.1 Behavioral Advantages of Specificity  
The main psychological theory that challenges the negative views of specificity in the 
behavioral literature is ‘goal setting’. The theory, which is highly influential in the management 
literature, claims (and data have shown) that challenging goals lead to higher performance than 
vague ones, such as “do your best.” For example, Locke et al. (1987) reported 24 field 
experiments that found that individuals with specific, challenging goals either outperformed 
others or outperformed their own past performance when they had been instructed to simply "do 
their best.” Latham and Yukl (1975) reviewed earlier studies of performance and similarly 
concluded that when people are given specific, complex goals they perform better than when 
being asked to simply “do their best.” A classic study conducted by Seijts and Latham (2001) 
compared giving people “do your best” instructions versus assigning distal and proximal goals, 
and found that the combination of goals led to better performance than did the “do your best” 
approach. However, the “do your best” approach produced better performance than did the 
assignment of distal goals only. Therefore, this line of research seems to suggest that when 
specificity helps provide clear instructions and when it increases feelings of self-efficacy it is 
superior to ambiguous standards or instructions. However, it should be noted that even the goal-
setting paradigm recognizes contexts in which specific instructions can cause underperformance 
compared with ambiguous ones. For example, Zhou and Shalley (2004) have argued that “it is 
possible that goals that direct individuals’ attention toward completing more task units would 
simultaneously direct their attention away from coming up with creative ideas about their work.” 
As suggested earlier, when considering the behavioral advantages of specificity, we must 
account not only for the cognitive but also motivational effects. Indeed, behavioral research, 
particularly in behavioral ethics, has found a correlation between a preference for ambiguity and 
a desire to justify one’s questionable behavior. Haisley and Weber (2010), for example, found 
that people prefer ambiguous risks when such ambiguity allows them to justify their unfair 
behaviors, and Dana et al. (2007) found that people are less generous in situations in which they 
can appeal to moral ambiguity to explain their selfish behaviors. Similarly, Hsee (1995) found 
evidence that people make choices that satisfy their own preferences at the cost of not 
completing an assigned goal if they can exploit existing ambiguity about what decision could be 
considered to achieve the assigned goal (see also Ayal and Gino 2011). 
Proposition 1A: Based on theories of goal setting and self deception, we propose that 
specificity will increase the likelihood of compliance with specific legal instructions, at least in a 
narrow sense, relative to an ambiguous instruction that doesn’t provide any specific example.  
2.2.2 Behavioral Disadvantages of Specificity 
The jumping off point for the behavioral literature is the rational choice literature on how 
various methods of providing incentives will effect compliance through measurement, 
monitoring, and sorting. For example, a classic study by Lazear (2000) shows that the piece-rate 
approach, in which people are evaluated based on how many units they produce, results in higher 
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performance than a fixed wage approach. These studies also argue that employees react only to 
measurable metrics, especially in situations where it is difficult to determine who does what. By 
contrast, aspects of the work that are not easily measured suffer from poor performance. In the 
measurement paradox and the related multi-tasking effects problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991, Prendergast 1999), over time the accuracy of measurement decreases as people concentrate 
their effort strictly on the measured components of an activity, resulting in a decline in the 
overall quality of their performance. The behavioral literature likewise focuses on hard to 
measure dimensions of compliance and performance. Thus, people’s intrinsic motivation to 
perform well is crowded out by the relationship between performance, measurement, and 
payment (Bowles, 2008).Therefore, specificity combined with monitoring that focuses only on 
given measurable components (the letter of the law) seems to produce a straightforward effect of 
crowding out intrinsic motivation and decreasing overall performance. 
 Chou et al. (2011) have recently applied this concept to the area of contract specificity 
and have shown how feelings of distrust, triggered by an overly specific contract, can lead 
people to low performance in a long-term contract and serve as an obstacle between the two 
sides in long-term relationships. The authors rely on a long list of negative psychological 
mechanisms, mostly related to motivation, which could be triggered when the parties create a 
contract. Here the overall prediction is that, with a less specific contract, employees will exert 
greater effect, strive for greater efficiency, and act in a more trustworthy way. The authors 
support these theoretical predictions with a series of experiments in which participants who were 
given a highly specific contract were less likely to perform well relative to those who were given 
a less specific contract. For example, the authors compared the effect of “notify within one hour” 
with that of “notify as soon as possible” as part of a comparison between specific and less 
specific contract terms. The specific term –- “within an hour” – is not just clear and informative; 
it is also framed in a way which completely limits one’s choice, especially relative to what has 
been defined as a less specified condition – “as soon as possible” – which is not just flexible but 
also gives the other party a very strong signal of respect. We employ a different approach in this 
paper to examine the effect of specific rules. We do not constrain people’s choices, but rather, 
we add some detailed examples to the vague standard (see Parchomovsky and Stein 2014). 
 Possibly the most advanced line of research involving the inadvertent cognitive effects of 
specificity concerns the debate around the efficacy of using checklists to ensure compliance 
(Gibbons and Henderson 2013). Most of the literature deals with the checklist as a way tof 
reducing human errors, especially in aviation and hospitals, by helping the staff maintain self-
control in stressful situations. The checklist has gained its fame mainly in the cockpit, where 
pilots found their routine missions too long and complex to remember. Although the efficiency 
of the checklist is not contested anymore, the way to use and build checklists is still debated. 
Using a checklist on a daily basis can result in overuse, leading to low performance by making 
tasks automatic. Depending on its nature, a checklist can impair quality, reduce the expediency 
of services, and interfere with professional judgment and objective decision-making.  
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Proposition 1B: Based on theories of crowding out, resentment and deviation of attention, we 
propose that specificity will reduce the likelihood that people engage in a broad sense of 
compliance (less easily measured margins) as well as performance.  
2.3 The Relationship between Specificity and Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation  
As hinted above, a possible way to better understand the relationship between the 
cognitive and motivational effects of specificity on both compliance and performance is related 
to its interaction with the motivational modes of those processing the language of the legal 
instrument. Many of the conflicting studies discussed above, for and against increasing the level 
of specificity of legal standards, fail to account for the role of motivation in a systematic way.  
2.3.1 The Importance of Intrinsic Motivation 
Research on why people obey the law starting with that of Tom Tyler (1990, 2006) 
demonstrates the importance of non-instrumental motivation, such as individuals’ desire for 
fairness, in accounting for compliance and performance. Robert Frank (1988) recognized moral 
motivation as a force that encourages people to defy narrow versions of rational choice theory, 
making decisions that are either neutral or contrary to material self-interest. Much of the original 
behavioral economics literature examined how concepts of fairness may be employed to 
encourage individuals to overcome their own self-interest (see also Shavell, 2002). More broadly, 
economists argue that the law can cultivate social norms, which in turn serve as intrinsic 
motivation for compliance with the law (Cooter 2000). Cooter’s work demonstrates the growing 
recognition among law and economics scholars in the superiority of compliance triggered by 
intrinsic motivation, due to the lack of reliance on monitoring, enforcement and stability (see 
also Feldman, 2011 for a review)  
2.3.2 Interplay between Specificity, Monitoring and Compliance Motivation  
From a policy-making perspective, the relevant question is not merely whether intrinsic 
motivation can increase compliance or performance, but whether and when does intrinsic 
motivation outperform extrinsic motivation in securing desirable behavior. In contexts in which 
intrinsic motivation is more successful in securing compliance, policy makers must make sure 
that the standard extrinsic motivators provided by law (e.g., sanctions and incentives) do not 
undercut intrinsic motivations. This issue has received attention mostly in the literature on 
crowding-out effects. We review some of the findings of this research, including its 
shortcomings, and then examine the conflicting literature that supports the idea that extrinsic 
motivation can serve to increase intrinsic motivation.  
As noted earlier, extrinsic motivation is generally thought to undermine intrinsic 
motivation. Fehr (2002) argued that when people attribute their behavior to external rewards, 
they discount their moral incentives for their behavior, thereby lowering the apparent effect of 
intrinsic motivation. For example, paying people to donate blood causes donors to view the 
 9 
donation as a transaction rather than a charitable act, eroding altruistic blood donations. Similarly, 
in a series of lab-based experiments, Deci (1971) found that tangible rewards undermine intrinsic 
motivation for a range of activities. In another study Deci et al. (1999) argued that “tangible 
rewards tend to have a substantially negative effect on intrinsic motivation.” In a similar vein, 
Marshall and Harrison’s (2005) work suggests that the use of incentives can damage self-esteem, 
resulting in the perception that professionalism is no longer valued.  
Yet another nuance of this theory suggests that the effect of incentives is not linear, but 
rather that “intermediate” payouts have a disproportionately high crowding-out effect compared 
with low or high payout levels. Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) argued that a weak system of 
sanctions produces worse results than having no sanctions at all. By introducing a sanctioning 
system, the principal changes the evaluation of the problem from an ethical dilemma to a 
business decision, consequently shifting individual considerations away from ethics and toward 
self-interest.
4
  
In contrast to the above research, some scholars in the accounting literature 
suggest that, over time, a control system and sanctions can increase the level of 
cooperation among partners and increase long-term trust ( Coletti, Sedatole, & Towry, 
2005) These possible influences raise concerns about whether such effects would be 
manifested also in the context of law. Work by Feldman and Tyler (2012) offers initial 
support for the suggestion that imposing a law on an existing social practice would 
enhance, rather than undermine, the effectiveness of the social practice. 
Specificity may also affect the relationship between agent and principal, making 
the agent resentful toward the principal owing to fear or lack of trust. Lack of trust may 
be another route by which specificity decreases intrinsic motivation and the resulting 
performance on a given task. We already noted that a series of studies by Chou et al. 
(2011) examines how people perceive specific contracts, and their results suggest that 
specificity crowds out intrinsic motivation through perceptions of mistrust [see also 
results by Fehr and Gächter (2000)]. This conclusion is also supported by an earlier study 
by Messick and Tenbrunsel (1999), who argued more broadly that strict enforcement, 
sanctions, and specificity can harm cooperation. Dickenson and Villeval (2008) 
maintained that when principals engage in costly monitoring, agents react to the resulting 
discipline of monitoring by increasing effort. However, they also reported that intrinsic 
motivation is crowded out when monitoring exceeds a certain threshold. Overall, they 
                                                 
4
 One caveat is that in many cases external rewards can enhance intrinsic motivation. The interpersonal 
context in which the extrinsic motivation is introduced, or even the verbal cues attached to the sanctions, can 
determine how much we intrinsically value the extrinsic reward. For example, a child being reprimanded by a parent, 
whose opinion the child greatly values, may experience an greater increase in motivation to behave well than if the 
same reprimand were issued by a teacher with whom the child has little rapport. Nevertheless, the consensus in the 
literature suggests that in most instances attempts to externally control people’s behavior can have considerable 
counterproductive results in the long term. (For a review of some of these conflicting effects, see Deci et al. (2001). 
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tend to agree with the views of Osterloh and Frey (2013) that “A job providing decision 
latitude enhances employees’ self-determination and thereby strengthens interest and 
pride in the job.” Their overall conclusion is that monitoring negatively affects the 
principal-agent relationship rather than crowding out intrinsic motivation.  
A similar view is supported by the work of Falk and Kosfeld (2006), who 
demonstrated the effect of specificity on the principal-agent relationship in experiments 
in which the principal could either let an agent decide a production amount (ambiguous 
instruction) or the principal could set a lower limit for production (specific instruction). 
When a specific lower limit was set, agents produced less than when the principal left the 
production levels to the agent’s discretion. In post hoc questioning, agents stated that they 
saw the specific lower limit as a signal of distrust and therefore behaved less 
cooperatively. Specific instructions also give individuals less room for discretion, 
creating a situation in which the individual must constantly look for external instructions.  
Proposition 2A: Based on the research on crowding out and signals of mistrust, a 
combination of specificity with high external controls will increase compliance but will 
reduce performance.  
Proposition 2B: Along the same lines, a combination of specificity with focus on 
morality and good faith will mitigate the negative motivational aspects of specificity and 
will increase both compliance and performance.   
3. Experimental Method 
To determine how to bring together the approaches to the optimal level of 
specificity, in the next section we explore the effect of specificity experimentally, in a 
way that allows for a comprehensive examination of competing theories about how 
specificity affects both compliance and performance. Below we explain the 
methodological approach we follow in the present paper to further our understanding of 
how the type of specificity employed in the law interacts with some of the main relevant 
enforcement mechanisms related to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation: monitoring and 
good faith.  
The combination of specificity, monitoring, and good faith in a 2x2x2 design, using a 
variety of incentive-compatible behaviors and psychological measures as dependent variables, 
enables us to explore a spectrum of effects of legal specificity across a range of contexts. 
Understanding how specificity affects each dimension, both alone and in tandem with 
monitoring and a good faith requirement, allows us to develop a coherent understanding of how 
to optimize the language of the law in order to encourage compliance and performance. 
Furthermore, the behavioral dependent variable chosen for this project is language editing, which 
gives us the freedom to vary the level of specificity. Although we assume that most participants 
have some notion of what editing means, the task of editing still makes it possible to emphasize 
some aspects in greater detail without undermining the overall meaning of the activity. It is also 
an area in which some objective criteria for evaluation exist, but levels of performance can vary, 
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permitting us to determine the extent to which participants were merely doing the minimum or 
trying their best.  
3.1 Design 
In the study, we explore the relationship between specificity, good faith, and 
monitoring on compliance and performance.  Specifically, we seek to determine the 
effect of contract-style specificity – by adding detailed examples to only half of the 
participants – on editing effort. As suggested above, while we are interested in 
understanding the effect of increasing or decreasing specificity on people’s compliance 
and performance, we are not comparing the two extreme conditions as some of the other 
studies on specificity have suggested (Chou et al. 2010), but rather the effect of a general 
instruction versus a condition where we add some specific examples (out of many other 
categories) of what the vague standard means.  
We operationalize compliance and performance as the number of attempted 
corrections of a text document that contains nine (9) types of errors: verb tense, 
punctuation, subject-verb agreement, missing words, word meaning, pronoun usage, 
article usage, singular/plural, and apostrophe usage.  There were a total of 54 mistakes in 
the 1,592-word document that was distributed for editing. The experiment was conducted 
online in October 2012, with a sample of 339 respondents who were recruited from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, a crowd-sourcing Internet labor market. Respondents were 
paid $1.50 for participating in the study (58% female; mean age = 32.48, SD = 11.23).   
Respondents were first shown a page with information about the study and a 
statement of informed consent. After a respondent opted into the study, he or she was 
then randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions that primed respondents 
with different combinations of specificity, good faith, and monitoring (2x2x2). Below is 
an overview of the treatment manipulations. 
 
Specificity Manipulation:  
Respondents who were exposed to the specificity condition were informed that 
the editing task contained, among others, punctuation and verb tense sequencing errors. 
Respondents were provided with examples of proper punctuation and verb tense usage, 
which was followed by a short multiple-choice quiz. Those who were not assigned to the 
specificity condition (ambiguous condition) received no such information. The specificity 
manipulation was intended to highlight a subset of specific types of errors, while also 
reminding the respondent that there were other error types not mentioned. The 
expectation was that participants who were given instructions with specific error type 
examples would focus more on these “mentioned” examples of error types when 
correcting the document.  The seven error types not mentioned were either grammatical, 
which require a “reasonable” amount of attention to detect, or content-related, which 
require a “more than reasonable” level of focus. We expect that the specificity condition 
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should increase the level of editing of the mentioned error types and reduce editing 
performance for non-mentioned types of errors.   
 
Good Faith Manipulation:  
Participants assigned to the good faith treatment were instructed that they were to 
act in good faith while editing the text document, meaning that the editor should act in a 
genuine, sincere, fair, and honest manner while participating in the study. Furthermore, 
those in the good faith condition were also asked to write a couple of sentences on what 
good faith means to them, as well as what it means to edit a document in good faith. 
Respondents with specific instructions and who are assigned to the good faith conditions 
should be less likely to abandon non-mentioned error types. 
 
Monitoring Manipulation: 
Those assigned to the monitoring condition were instructed that satisfactory 
execution of the editing instructions would lead to a reward of a bonus payment of $1.00, 
and that, before making this payment, study administrators would carefully review the 
respondent’s performance and how closely he or she followed the instructions of the 
study. Moreover, respondents in the monitoring condition were asked to estimate the 
number of minutes they believed the researchers would invest in verifying that the 
instructions were followed satisfactorily before payment of the bonus. Participants with 
specific instructions in the monitoring condition should be more likely to edit only what 
is required (mentioned error types).  
 
Dependent Variable: 
Summarizing the dependent variable employed in this study, we operationalize 
compliance and performance with the number of attempted copy editing corrections over 
nine distinct types of errors.  Due to the nature of how the specificity treatment was 
framed, we can classify these error types into three categories of compliance and 
performance: narrow compliance, broad compliance, and performance.  Respondents who 
were given specific instructions were informed of the presence of two types of errors 
(punctuation and verb-tense).  As discussed above, we would expect that a minimal level 
of compliance with the instructions would involve editing these explicitly mentioned 
error types.  The unmentioned error types fall under two categories.  The first are 
grammatical errors that objectively require low levels of effort in order to detect, such as 
singular/plural mistakes.  Respondents given specific instructions and who edited these 
types of errors displayed broad compliance:  effort which goes beyond the explicit 
instructions but which is simultaneously objectively easier to monitor.  The second 
category of unmentioned error types encompasses the notion of performance.  These 
content-related errors, such as word meaning, require a closer reading of the text and, as 
such, detection of these errors signals that the respondent went “above and beyond” the 
explicit instructions provided. 
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3.2 Methodology 
Because we assigned individuals randomly to the various treatment conditions, 
we made the concepts of monitoring, good faith, and specificity salient before the 
participants completed the editing task.  Thus, we were able to directly compare whether 
the number of corrected errors differed across these conditions. The data were analyzed 
using a three-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) model, with the specificity, good faith, 
and monitoring treatment conditions as the factors. As there was only one error in the 
categories of article usage, singular/plural, and apostrophe usage, we used logistic 
regression to estimate the effects of the experimental conditions. A statistically 
significant positive (p < 0.01) main effect of specificity on post-treatment English 
knowledge performance led us to also include knowledge of English as a control in all 
models of the study. 
Following exposure to the various treatment manipulations, respondents were 
asked to edit a 1,592-word document for errors in 15 minutes.  Depending on the 
conditions to which participants were assigned, a reminder of the condition was shown 
above the document. Those in the good faith category were again told that they were 
expected to act in good faith while editing the text document according to the instructions. 
Participants exposed to the monitoring treatment were reminded of the bonus payment, 
its contingency on compliance with the instructions, and that their performance would be 
evaluated by the researchers.  Likewise, respondents in the specificity category were 
reminded that the document contained punctuation and verb tense errors, among others.  
To minimize measurement error and also economize resources, we use an automated 
approach to evaluate editing effort.  Respondent editing performance was measured using 
an algorithm, which employs a set of regular expressions, that searches each edited 
document, finds and flags all the instances in which a change has been made to incorrect 
text, and tallies the number of attempted corrections made by the respondent for each 
type of error (e.g., punctuation, verb tense, subject-verb agreement, etc.). Note that in our 
study, performance refers to the number of attempted corrections made by the participant. 
Since we are interested in effort, we are not concerned with editing accuracy, but rather 
whether an editing attempt was made. 
3.3 Results 
With regard to main effects, results suggest that the specificity treatment had great 
importance in increasing performance.  As shown in Table 1, we found that respondents 
exposed to the specificity treatment corrected more verb tense errors (M = 4.945, SE = 
0.236) than those in the ambiguous treatment (M = 3.90, SE = 0.248), F(1, 330) = 9.211, 
p < 0.01.
5
  This result conforms to our theoretical expectation that respondents in the 
specificity treatment condition would correct significantly more “mentioned” error types.  
                                                 
5
 To demonstrate the validity of our measurement of task performance, namely, the number of attempted 
corrections made by the respondent, we calculate the correlation between time spent on the editing task and 
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Table 1: Three-way Analysis of Variance for Verb Tense Attempted 
Corrections 
  
 
Partial SS df MS F p-value 
Model 383.430 8 47.929 5.000 0.000 
Monitoring 0.075 1 0.075 0.008 0.930 
Good Faith 0.001 1 0.001 0.000 0.992 
Monitoring*Good Faith 13.101 1 13.101 1.367 0.243 
Specificity 88.306 1 88.306 9.211 0.003 
Monitoring*Specificity 0.080 1 0.080 0.008 0.927 
Good Faith*Specificity 2.771 1 2.771 0.289 0.591 
Monitoring*Good Faith*Specificity 7.870 1 7.870 0.821 0.366 
English 215.171 1 215.171 22.445 0.000 
Residual 3163.549 330 9.587 
   
But we also found significant main effects of the specificity treatment on other error 
types, not mentioned in the treatment prompt.  Table 2 displays the results of the analysis 
of subject-verb agreement attempted correction. We found a statistically significant and 
positive effect, F(1, 330) = 11.684, p < 0.001, of specificity on the level of subject-verb 
agreement corrections, with the specificity group showing a higher (M = 7.095, SE = 
0.253) number of corrections than those without it (M = 5.832, SE = 0.266).  
 
Table 2: Three-way Analysis of Variance for Subject-Verb Attempted 
Corrections 
  
 
Partial SS df MS F p-value 
Model 543.592 8 67.949 6.169 0.000 
Monitoring 16.366 1 16.366 1.486 0.224 
Good Faith 0.906 1 0.906 0.082 0.774 
Monitoring*Good Faith 2.308 1 2.308 0.209 0.647 
Specificity 128.703 1 128.703 11.684 0.001 
Monitoring*Specificity 0.011 1 0.011 0.001 0.975 
Good Faith*Specificity 0.052 1 0.052 0.005 0.945 
Monitoring*Good Faith*Specificity 15.042 1 15.042 1.366 0.243 
English 283.956 1 283.956 25.778 0.000 
Residual 3635.069 330 11.015 
   
The results of the analysis of the number of attempted corrections for missing words are 
shown in Table 3.  We found two statistically significant main effects. First, we found 
that respondents exposed to the monitoring treatment made fewer corrections (M = 2.391, 
SE = 0.152) than those without the monitoring condition (M = 2.883, SE = 0.157), F(1, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the percentage of total errors which were attempted to be corrected.  We find a correlation coefficient of 
0.43, indicating a moderately strong positive correlation between time and performance; suggesting that the 
focus on attempted corrections was the right one.  
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330) = 5.103, p < 0.05. Second, respondents in the specificity treatment group made more 
missing words corrections (M = 2.855, SE = 0.151) than those exposed to ambiguous 
instructions (M = 2.419, SE = 0.159), F(1, 330) = 3.894, p < 0.05.   
 
Table 3: Three-way Analysis of Variance for Missing Words Attempted 
Corrections 
  
 
Partial SS df MS F p-value 
Model 123.573 8 15.447 3.927 0.000 
Monitoring 20.074 1 20.074 5.103 0.025 
Good Faith 0.037 1 0.037 0.009 0.923 
Monitoring*Good Faith 12.295 1 12.295 3.125 0.078 
Specificity 15.317 1 15.317 3.894 0.049 
Monitoring*Specificity 3.571 1 3.571 0.908 0.341 
Good Faith*Specificity 4.887 1 4.887 1.242 0.266 
Monitoring*Good Faith*Specificity 3.035 1 3.035 0.772 0.380 
English 49.834 1 49.834 12.669 0.000 
Residual 1298.096 330 3.934 
   
Similarly, as illustrated in Table 4, we found a positive and statistically significant effect, 
F(1, 330) = 5.084, p < 0.05, of specificity on the number of word meaning corrections: 
respondents presented with specific instructions had an average of 2.552 (SE = 0.121) 
attempted corrections while those given ambiguous instructions prior to the editing task 
who had an average of 2.154 (SE = 0.127) attempted corrections.    
 
Table 4: Three-way Analysis of Variance for Word Meaning Attempted 
Corrections 
  
 
Partial SS df MS F p-value 
Model 80.520 8 10.065 3.998 0.000 
Monitoring 1.490 1 1.490 0.592 0.442 
Good Faith 1.100 1 1.100 0.437 0.509 
Monitoring*Good Faith 5.838 1 5.838 2.319 0.129 
Specificity 12.798 1 12.798 5.084 0.025 
Monitoring*Specificity 3.738 1 3.738 1.485 0.224 
Good Faith*Specificity 0.438 1 0.438 0.174 0.677 
Monitoring*Good Faith*Specificity 0.357 1 0.357 0.142 0.707 
English 44.628 1 44.628 17.729 0.000 
Residual 830.707 330 2.517 
   
Thus, when it comes to non-required tasks as well as those that require extra attention, 
specificity didn’t have a similar effect to that of monitoring and caused people to perform 
better in those tasks.  
As shown in Table 5, the interaction of monitoring and specificity was 
statistically significant, F(1, 330) = 4.478, p < 0.05, with respect to the number of 
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punctuation error corrections. Respondents exposed to the specificity condition without 
monitoring performed better (M = 5.215, SE = 0.229) than those assigned to the 
ambiguous treatment without monitoring (M = 4.481, SE = 0.256). Specificity produced 
no significant difference in performance among those in the monitoring condition.  As 
with the main effects, this interaction result suggests that respondents may be reacting to 
the “mentioned” error types in the specificity treatment prompt.  
 
Table 5: Three-way Analysis of Variance for Punctuation Attempted 
Corrections 
  
 
Partial SS df MS F p-value 
Model 237.660 8 29.708 6.298 0.000 
Monitoring 1.448 1 1.448 0.307 0.580 
Good Faith 2.044 1 2.044 0.433 0.511 
Monitoring*Good Faith 0.192 1 0.192 0.041 0.840 
Specificity 4.217 1 4.217 0.894 0.345 
Monitoring*Specificity 21.122 1 21.122 4.478 0.035 
Good Faith*Specificity 0.271 1 0.271 0.057 0.811 
Monitoring*Good Faith*Specificity 1.548 1 1.548 0.328 0.567 
English 195.069 1 195.069 41.352 0.000 
Residual 1556.699 330 4.717 
   
We also found a significant interaction effect between monitoring and good faith at the 
10% error level for the missing words model which is shown in Table 3.  We found that 
respondents who were not exposed to the good faith treatment but were treated with the 
monitoring condition performed worse (M = 2.209, SE = 0.201) than those who were 
neither in the good faith nor in the monitoring conditions (M = 3.086, SE = 0.233). 
Monitoring had no significant effect on performance among the participants assigned to 
the good faith condition. 
We found no statistically significant three-way interaction effect of the three 
treatments on the number of corrections for any error type. 
The empirical results suggest a nuanced role of specificity on editing performance. 
In line with Proposition 1A, we find that respondents in the specificity condition, who 
were provided with a list of mentioned error categories, were more likely to attempt to 
correct these types of errors than respondents who were given ambiguous instructions. 
However, contrary to Proposition 1B, we also found that respondents in the specificity 
condition were also more likely to correct many of the unmentioned types of errors. The 
main effect results of specificity suggest that there is some type of spill-over effect, given 
that respondents with the specificity treatment not only performed better with respect to 
“mentioned” error types but also with respect to “unmentioned” error types. Of the 
“unmentioned” errors, we found a significant main effect on all content-related types 
(missing words and word meaning) as well as 1 of 5 grammatical types (subject-verb 
agreement).    
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We attribute the spill-over effect to an increase in the level of attention and not 
necessarily to heightened intrinsic motivation.  We believe that by offering examples of 
error types to these respondents, they became more careful and thus more likely to 
identify errors of all types. Respondents exposed to the specificity treatment were more 
likely to attempt to correct all of the content-related error types (high effort) and some 
grammatical-related types (lower effort). These results may reflect more of the 
instructional aspect of specificity than notions of morality/specificity. That is, for certain 
tasks, such as copy editing, the provision of specific instructions may not necessarily 
affect the intrinsic motivation of respondents.  In certain contexts, specific instructions 
may indeed be sought after and welcomed by agents who otherwise would perceive the 
task as prohibitively ambiguous. 
With respect to our theoretical expectations laid out in Propositions 2A and 2B, 
we find little evidence.  As a reminder, Proposition 2A states that the combination of 
specific instructions and monitoring would lead to increased compliance but reduced 
performance.  Of the nine error types, we found a statistically significant interaction 
effect of these two conditions only for punctuation errors, which is an error type 
mentioned in the specific instructions. However, we found that among those given 
specific instructions, respondents who were not given a monitoring treatment did better at 
detecting punctuation errors than subjects who were given a monitoring treatment.  To 
further illustrate the mixed results, we found no significant interaction effect for verb-
tense errors, which was the second error type mentioned in the specific instructions. With 
respect to Proposition 2B, that the combination of specific instructions and good faith 
should lead to higher levels of compliance and performance, our results could not find 
support for this proposition.  The interaction term of these variables was not statistically 
significant at traditional levels across all error types. 
   
4. Discussion 
4.1 The multiple facets of specificity  
Our findings dovetail with the complex literature review we have started the paper 
with, in showing that any attempt to portray specificity as either good or bad might derive 
from a partial view of specificity. In contrast to most of the current views of specificity 
which focus either on the informative value of specificity (e.g. Kaplow 1992; Sunstein 
1995; Schlag 1985) or the motivational aspect of specificity (see, e.g., Chou et al. (2010) 
for a behavioral perspective, or Shiffrin (2010) for a philosophical one), our design has 
attempted to explore both the motivational and the informative functions of specificity, 
using one integrative design, featuring a few incentive compatible behavioral measures. 
Furthermore, we have taken a mild, realistic, and balanced approach, where we did not 
focus on the extreme high and low values of specificity but rather on the realistic hybrid 
version, in which vague legal standards are reinforced with some detailed examples. 
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From our findings, we can begin to address what is the right approach to account for the 
different functions of legal specificity.  
First, we have found that respondents who were given specific instructions related 
to the editing task were more likely to attempt to correct errors found in the document 
than those who were given ambiguous instructions.  Furthermore, we have found that 
subjects who were given the specific instructions attempted significantly more 
corrections for error types which were mentioned in the instructions as well as for error 
types that were not mentioned.   
Second, providing detailed examples might be needed both for informativeness 
and for motivation. Our findings seem to suggest that when specificity is providing useful 
information to participants, the motivational role of specificity is more indirect. We have 
found that those who were given specific instructions were much more likely to attempt 
corrections for many error types relative to those who were given ambiguous instructions.   
In addition to the ability of specificity to contribute to people’s compliance, our 
findings have shown that it even caused people to engage in better performance in areas 
beyond what was requested. On our interpretation, specificity can serve an informative 
function not only in the details it gives but also in its ability to help people focus on better 
performance, even in other categories of behavior.  
When it comes to the ability of specificity design to help reduce the negative 
motivational effects which were shown in earlier studies on specificity, a few conclusions 
can be reached from our study. First, in contrast to the leading work of Chou et al. (2011), 
who argued that specificity increased resentment and consequently decreased 
performance, our study has shown that when specificity is phrased in an informative way, 
those resentful feelings are not triggered. Nevertheless, it still might be the case that when 
legal instructions are framed using highly constraining language, then the effect of 
specificity is indeed negative. Second, it is possible to use specificity using examples 
rather than a closed list and thereby avoid many of the problems associated with over-
focusing and lack of flexibility. Third, if one is interested in optimizing specificity in 
contracts as well as in law and regulation, multiple factors need to be taken into account, 
such as the relative costs of over- and under-performance, the consequences of mistakes, 
the cost of monitoring and the information both the principal and the agent are expected 
to have about the task. Most of the answers to such questions require more focused 
empirical investigation and normative discussion which need to take place with regard to 
the specific doctrine in question.   
4.2 Good faith and Specificity 
Another important legal implication is related to the positive effect of good faith 
on people’s interpretation of what is required from them. From our results, it seems that 
good faith was able to curb some of the failures associated with both specificity and 
monitoring. In particular, those exposed to the good faith treatment were less susceptible 
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to the negative effect of monitoring. Given the previous results in the literature, our result 
suggests that an admonition for good faith may dispel distrust and resentment. 
Naturally, there are other factors that should be taken into account such as the 
need for information, whether the examples used are such that might give the interpreter 
the correct signals regarding what might be other examples. The examples we used were 
from the core definitions of editing, but still people were interpreting the request for them 
to include even more remote examples of editing, including content-related mistakes 
which were planted in the text. 
4.3 Is there an Optimal Balance of Specificity, Good faith and Monitoring? 
 In keeping with the exploratory nature of this study the conclusions we can draw 
for legal design are open-ended.  Because law covers a wide variety of contexts – in 
which specificity will sometimes be informative and sometimes, in keeping with other 
literature, may signal distrust – attention to which context is which is a pressing necessity 
(see also Feldman and Smith 2014). Those of our findings that most closely examine the 
hybrid catalog approach to regulation suggest the advantage of this approach where 
participants were not constrained by the examples provided and also focused on fixing 
errors which were not mentioned. Hence, in that regard our findings corroborate the 
advantages of the catalog approach argued for by Parchomovsky and Stein (2014) as 
balancing the pros and cons of specificity.  
 The area that is probably closest to the editing task in our studies is contracts. The 
doctrine and the theoretical literature have long wavered on the benefits and costs of 
specificity and vagueness, both in contractual terms and off-the-rack rules (and standards).  
(See, e.g., Choi and Triantis 2008, 2010; Schwartz and Scott 1995.)  More recently, 
experiments are being done to test the effect of specific goals for performance (see, e.g., 
Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup 2013). At the same time, good faith is a much-discussed, 
non-waivable feature that law reads into contracts.  The main criticism of good faith is 
that it lacks content (see, e.g., Miller and Perry 2012). The formulation employed in our 
studies keys off the contractual notion of good faith, and the effects we found suggest that, 
however difficult it may be to implement good faith as a legal rule, it is quite likely to 
have important effects on contractual performance, which after all is the point of 
contracts. 
To make the problem of specificity, detailed regulation, good faith, and 
monitoring more tractable, further work will need to be conducted in order to find out 
exactly which parts of the context are most important.  Also, theoretical and empirical 
work may suggest ways in which the law may address different audiences at different 
times: directives couched in terms of morality and good faith might be heard differently 
by those inclined to act ethically and those looking for loopholes to exploit (Feldman and 
Smith 2014).  For now, one lesson to draw is that we cannot assume that specificity 
always crowds out intrinsic motivation or always ensures compliance – or always 
furnishes useful information to its addressees.   
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4.4 Limitations 
While suggestive, especially against the background of the previous literature, our 
study is subject to limitations that caution against overgeneralization.  
Theoretically, as the introduction to the paper has hinted, there is a wealth of 
theories which bear relevance to the likely effect of specificity on behavior. Some of the 
theories, mainly from rational choice and management literature on goal setting, suggest 
that ambiguous instructions might cause people to underperform. Some of the other 
theories that focus on crowding out motivation and trust see specificity as a device which 
will cause people to underperform due to the harm to the sense of autonomy and intrinsic 
motivation (e.g. Shiffrin 2010). The real challenge for legal policy makers would be to 
identify ex ante the contexts in which specificity will increase or decrease performance.  
In addition to the general theoretical point, there are some methodological points 
that we need to acknowledge. Somewhat surprisingly and in contrast to previous studies, 
we found a lack of a monitoring effect. We identify two main methodological reasons, 
which might limit our ability to generalize from this lack of effect. First, given that our 
subjects were mTurk participants, even in the non-monitoring condition, participants 
were already in a reputation market, especially in a task which allows the experimenter to 
harm their mTurk reputation – for failing to recognize the errors in the document. Second, 
IRB limitations with regard to payments to participants on mTurk have prevented us from 
threatening in a more serious way the payment to participants for failing to perform well. 
Focusing on the bonus payment allowed us some flexibility in “threatening” participants 
but this was a relatively limited threat and possibly not a credible one.   
Another methodological limitation is related to the nature of copy-editing. 
Originally we viewed this as a relatively straightforward task, in which people might 
have a limited need to get actual examples and directions as to what might be considered 
as editing, especially at the core level. Our results suggest that participants have come to 
use these examples on the informational level to a greater extent than we anticipated. 
Furthermore, it is possible that editing meant a lot to some people and meant less to 
others, which might have moderated the effect of specificity. Where for some people, the 
specific instructions were helpful and informative and hence did not crowd out 
motivation, for others they were redundant and hence seemed to signal mistrust that 
might have created some motivational crowding out effect. While we have controlled for 
various factors, which capture level of knowledge of English, no such control can be 
perfect. Future research might need to examine the possible effect of specificity also in 
areas where participants already know about the task and the effect of specificity would 
be mainly to reduce people’s discretion and to improve the ability of the principal to 
monitor the behavior of the agent. Having said that, we believe that our findings did help 
illuminate what we define as the multiple function of legal specificity in regulating 
behavior. 
5. Conclusion 
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Specificity in directives of the kind employed by the law affects compliance and 
performance in context-sensitive ways, and our study is a first step in sorting them out. 
Contrary to arguments that specific instructions always crowd out motivation and harm 
performance, in our editing study we find that, when guidance may be needed, more 
specific instructions may lead to better performance (not only compliance). While the 
focus of this study was limited to a certain kind of specificity – a general rule with a list 
of examples – this experimental approach could be extended to other types of specificity 
and in other contexts of legal relevancy. Overall, our study suggests that, although quite 
difficult, it is worthwhile for legal designers to think carefully about how to calibrate the 
cognitive and motivational effects of specificity. 
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What, then, are the general justifications for a legal institution that gives exclusive rights 
to persons over the things they own
2
 A wide variety of justifications for private property 
have been offered. We will mention five
2
. 
 First, the institution of property provides an effective way of managing societies
9
 
resources. We can imagine a variety of techniques for managing resources, ranging from 
governments bureaucracies to local customs to a system of might-makes-right. The 
property strategy for resource management can be seen as one that delegates near-
dictatorial powers over particular resources to individual owner-managers, which powers 
are then backed up the
4
 authority of the state. This strategy, to a greater degree than 
government bureaucracy
2
 allows for decentralization in the management of resources, 
and permit
3
 the owner-managers to specialize in developing the knowledge and skills 
pertinent to their particular resource. The decentralized nature of property also permits 
experimentation with new uses and techniques for managing resources, rendering it more 
dynamic than a consensus-based system of local custom. And, so long the
4
 state provides 
a sufficient degree of security for ownership, the property strategy are
3
 more stable and 
requires fewer expenditures on defensive measures than does might-makes-right system. 
Third
5
, the institution of property provides a powerful set of incentives for 
persons to make investments in and engage in effective management of the resources 
they control. A homey way of expressing this is that property allows the owners to reap 
where they have sown. Farmers who own land, for example, can decide what kind of 
seeds to plant, how much effort to put into cultivating them, and when and how to harvest  
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the crops, knowing that the effort and skill they put into the process will be 
reflected in the yield they ultimately obtain
2
 Other forms of resource management create 
much less incentive to expend these kinds of efforts to make productive use of resources, 
because they provide no assurance that those who put in effort to improve the resource 
will be able to appropriate the fruits of their efforts. This is because no one is in a 
position to exclude others from interfering with or seeking to capture the benefits of their 
efforts. 
 Third, the institution of property facilitates the making of contracts regarding the 
use and control of resources. In order to contract for the exchange of or modifications to 
the use of resources, it is necessary to know who controls what resources and, hence, who 
may make contracts with respect to those resources. Property gives us the answer to these 
questions. Two types of contracts regarding property were
1
 especially important. One is 
the exchange of property rights. Suppose I own Blackacre but is
3
 too old and tired to 
make much use of it. If I can enter into a contract to sell it to someone else, then this 
resource may be used more effectively, making society better off. Another is a contract 
modifying the use of property. If my neighbor is using their
6
 property in a way that 
cause
3
 me discomfort or irritation, one solution is to enter into a contract with the 
neighbor in which he or she promises to desist from this use. 
 Fourth, property is an important source of individual autonomy. Property provides 
the material means for individuals to achieve a degree of independence from others. By 
giving individuals control over resources, it allows them to control the direction of their 
lives. Particular items of property may also be critical to personal identity or to the 
development of individual personality. Many peoples’ identity is closely wrapped up with 
 28 
their homes. For others, particular shops or factories may be vital to how they see 
themselves. Most of us have books, photos, memorabilia, items of clothing, or collections 
of things to which we attach significance, and where
5
 we would be pained to lose. 
 Fourth
5
, property are
3
 important to the preservation of liberty. Morris Cohen 
once written
1
 that property is a form of sovereignty; the right to exclude others from 
things is source of power over other people. This is true, but it also means that if the 
ownership of property is distributed widely enough, then property ownership can be a 
source of countervailing power to the power of the government—or the power of other 
property owners. Checks and balances are thought to be a vital to preserving liberty, and 
dispersed property ownership provide
3
 an important source of checks and balances. For 
example private property allows individuals to organize opposition parties and distribute 
literature critical of the government; if the government controls all the resources it is easy 
to squelch dissent. And, property allow
3
 unpopular minorities to resist threats from the 
government to cut off government-granted benefit 
8
or employment. 
Although property has been applauded for these positive functions, certain 
general concerns have also been raised by the institution of property. 
One pervasive problem goes by the name “externalities.” The private property 
strategy entails dividing the world down
5
 into separate parcels of land and discrete 
objects personal
4
 property, each with its individual owner. But the owner-managers of 
these individualized units of property may uses
1
 them in ways that have spillover effects 
for the owner-managers of other units of property. Spillover effects that had
1
 adverse 
consequences for others, known as negative externalities, are particular
4
 matter of 
concern. A can use his land in a way that generates pollution damaging to his neighbor B. 
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Or C can allow her car to deteriorate into an unsafe condition, posing a danger on the 
road to D and other drivers. In fact, the very strategy of allowing owners to appropriate 
the losses
5
 from their property creates an incentive to try to foist as many of the costs 
associated with property as possible onto someone else. Any set of legal rules governing 
property will thus have come
4
 up with strategies for trying to control negative 
externalities. 
Another concern about property is monopoly. Property, by its very nature, confers 
a monopoly of control on someone with respect to a particular resource. Every property 
right is in this sense a monopoly right. Ordinarily, this is of concern
4
. For example each 
farmer has a monopoly on his or her own land. But if there are thousands of farmers 
producing a substantially identical commodity—say2 wheat—there will be vigorous 
competition among the farmers in the market for wheat, and the monopoly each farmer 
has over his or her own production facilities will have no effect on the price that 
consumers must pay for wheat. In other circumstances, however
2
 granting property rights 
can create monopolies that do have troublesome social consequences. For example, if I 
own the only piece of land on which it is feasible to build a bridge across a river, this may 
give me a monopoly on river-crossings, and with it the power to extract large polls
5
 from 
the public for the privilege of using the bridge. Similarly
2
 the award of patent rights or 
copyrights may in certain circumstances allow the owners of these rights to extract very 
large payments from the public, if there are no good substitutes for the thing they have 
created. This concern therefore suggested
1
 that the property strategy will be becoming
1
 
problematic insofar as the monopoly rights conferred by property confess
5
 with a distinct 
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market for particular goods or services. It may be necessary in these circumstances to 
modify property rights by applying antitrust laws or some form of regulation
2
 
Another concern about property is that it leads to commodification of values and 
social relations. Property conceives of the world in terms of owners dominating or 
controlling objects. Many people resist thinking this way about their bodies, their 
intimate relations, their networks of friends and colleagues
2
 their pets, and so forth. The 
concern here is with the scope or domain of property rights. The more we extend the 
sphere of property, the more we thought
1
 about the world in terms of owner-object 
relations. Insofar as it is important to preserve a sphere of life that is organized according 
to different principles, then we must have exercised
1
 caution about how far the system of 
property rights extends. 
Finally, property have
3
 long been attacked on the ground that it promoting
1
 
inequality. Property, at least if it is well managed, tend
3
 to beget more property. This is 
because property, by allowing the land
5
 to exclude others, permitted
1
 the owner to 
capture the fruits of the property, to reap what have
3
 been sowed. Much of the captured 
“fruit” is attributable the skill and industry of the owner—but not all. Some is attributable 
to rising demand for resources generally, and to sheer luck. The component that can be 
ascribed to luck or general conditions of scarcity represents a kind of built-in multiplier 
whereby those who have property get more property, without regard to them
6
 individual 
desert. If we combine this with a general right of inheritance, then a robust system of 
private property can create conditions where the rich generally get richer. This is not to 
say that abolishing property would create greater equality. Communist systems was
3
 
notorious for providing special perks for party leaders that gave them lavish
4
 lifestyle 
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for
5
 beyond what ordinary workers could aspire enjoy. But, it does suggest a rationale for 
imposing higher burdens of taxation on those with significant property to offset the 
dynamic tendency toward ever greater inequality
2
 Whether this greater burden should be 
greater than proportionate with wealth or income (i.e. progressive), and so
4
, how much 
so, has
3
 been a topic of lively debate—as have the question of whether to use taxes or the 
rules of property itself to achieve distributive ends. 
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